The European Union's migration policy and arms exports have inadvertently empowered Sudan's warlords, who have capitalized on years of EU funding and equipment to fuel a devastating conflict. Decades of authoritarian rule in Sudan had already created a fragile economy and security forces, but the 2019 coup that overthrew Omar al-Bashir sparked a new wave of violence.
The EU's strategy of "externalising" migration control, providing aid, training, and equipment to African states to reduce irregular migration towards Europe, has had unintended consequences. In Sudan, this approach merged with opaque arms flows, Gulf intermediaries, and weak oversight, allowing the EU-funded Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to benefit from billions of euros in funding.
The European Union's own claims that it does not provide financial support directly to the Sudanese government are contradicted by evidence, including a 2018 factsheet stating "The EU does not provide any financial support to the Government of Sudan..." However, an investigation by Deutsche Welle revealed that EU funding was being diverted for repressive aims.
EU arms exports have also contributed to the conflict. French-made systems and British military equipment found in RSF convoys suggest that European-made weapons are fueling the violence. The use of 81mm mortar shells found in Sudanese battlefields, which were manufactured by a Bulgarian firm exported to the UAE, highlights a pattern of diversion.
European suppliers share responsibility for ensuring compliance with export regulations. However, governments continue to issue new export licences to potential violators, including the UAE. The UK approved over $227 million in military exports to the UAE between April and June this year, despite being informed that Emirati-supplied equipment had reached the RSF.
The lack of control over arms shipments is not unique to Europe; South Africa has faced similar criticism for its failure to ensure compliance with end-user agreements. Evidence suggests that South African weapons may have been diverted to Sudan as well.
To reclaim credibility, democratic governments must implement enforceable end-use monitoring. Export control authorities and the EU must publish transparent audits of past licences, investigate credible diversion cases, and suspend new approvals where risk remains unmitigated. Without these measures, Europe's migration policy and South Africa's defence trade risk complicity in a grim paradox: initiatives justified in the name of security that foster insecurity.
The EU's strategy of "externalising" migration control, providing aid, training, and equipment to African states to reduce irregular migration towards Europe, has had unintended consequences. In Sudan, this approach merged with opaque arms flows, Gulf intermediaries, and weak oversight, allowing the EU-funded Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to benefit from billions of euros in funding.
The European Union's own claims that it does not provide financial support directly to the Sudanese government are contradicted by evidence, including a 2018 factsheet stating "The EU does not provide any financial support to the Government of Sudan..." However, an investigation by Deutsche Welle revealed that EU funding was being diverted for repressive aims.
EU arms exports have also contributed to the conflict. French-made systems and British military equipment found in RSF convoys suggest that European-made weapons are fueling the violence. The use of 81mm mortar shells found in Sudanese battlefields, which were manufactured by a Bulgarian firm exported to the UAE, highlights a pattern of diversion.
European suppliers share responsibility for ensuring compliance with export regulations. However, governments continue to issue new export licences to potential violators, including the UAE. The UK approved over $227 million in military exports to the UAE between April and June this year, despite being informed that Emirati-supplied equipment had reached the RSF.
The lack of control over arms shipments is not unique to Europe; South Africa has faced similar criticism for its failure to ensure compliance with end-user agreements. Evidence suggests that South African weapons may have been diverted to Sudan as well.
To reclaim credibility, democratic governments must implement enforceable end-use monitoring. Export control authorities and the EU must publish transparent audits of past licences, investigate credible diversion cases, and suspend new approvals where risk remains unmitigated. Without these measures, Europe's migration policy and South Africa's defence trade risk complicity in a grim paradox: initiatives justified in the name of security that foster insecurity.
just saw that the EU approved another €100m arms deal with UAE 
meanwhile, reports are coming in that Sudanese warlords are getting arms shipments from France and UK, fueling the devastating conflict 
it's like they're playing a never-ending game of 'don't get caught' 
and it's us who end up paying the price 
the lack of transparency around EU arms exports is just mind-boggling 
I'm so done with how EU's migration policies are being used to fuel conflicts abroad 
. They're basically giving billions to Sudan without even knowing where it's going and now those funds are lining the pockets of warlords 
. It's like they're playing a game of geopolitical whack-a-mole, thinking that by giving aid to one country, they'll magically stop migration from another 
.
. They're basically arming warlords and letting them do their thing 
. It's not just the EU's fault, though - governments everywhere are failing to enforce export regulations and make sure these weapons aren't ending up in the wrong hands 
.
. That means publishing transparent audits, investigating diversion cases, and suspending new approvals until we're confident that these policies won't be sabotaged again 
. We can't keep pretending that we care about security while fostering more insecurity in the process 
.
EU's migration policy is like giving Sudan warlords a huge playground 
to play with. They just get stronger with each new batch of gear 
and cash 
. It's crazy how they can spin it as not directly funding the Sudanese government, but that factsheet from 2018 is still out there 
. I mean, what's the point of giving aid if it's all just going to end up in the wrong hands? 
And have you seen those reports on EU arms exports being sold to the UAE and then ending up with Sudan's RSF? 
It's like a game of international whack-a-mole, where every time they try to crack down, more and more arms show up 
. We can't just keep playing along without checking our own hands 
.
And then there's this whole arms export thing... I don't get why European governments are still issuing new export licenses to countries that have no problem using their stuff for bad guys. It's like they're not even trying to do the right thing 
.
. They're essentially enabling Sudan's warlords by funneling billions of euros into their pockets, while claiming they're not directly supporting the government 
. The EU needs to get its act together and start enforcing some real controls if they want to stop enabling these warlords 
.
all those billions of euros just going straight into warlords' pockets has been an awesome way to test whether their new strategy works in practice, and btw who needs transparency when you've got bribes and backroom deals? 
The fact that governments are still issuing new export licences to countries with a history of diverting EU funds is, like, crazy talk 
. They're essentially funding warlords and giving them European-made arms, which are then used to fuel a devastating conflict 
. We need better oversight, more transparency, and a lot less handouts to countries with questionable track records 
. I mean think about it - EU funding and equipment are basically fueling this war in Sudan, and now we're expecting the Sudanese government to be all good? It just doesn't add up, right? We need to take responsibility for what we do, especially when it comes to arms exports 
I drew a mind map to visualize how EU's "externalising" migration control strategy can inadvertently empower warlords in Sudan: