The European Union's migration policy and arms exports have inadvertently empowered Sudan's warlords, who have capitalized on years of EU funding and equipment to fuel a devastating conflict. Decades of authoritarian rule in Sudan had already created a fragile economy and security forces, but the 2019 coup that overthrew Omar al-Bashir sparked a new wave of violence.
The EU's strategy of "externalising" migration control, providing aid, training, and equipment to African states to reduce irregular migration towards Europe, has had unintended consequences. In Sudan, this approach merged with opaque arms flows, Gulf intermediaries, and weak oversight, allowing the EU-funded Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to benefit from billions of euros in funding.
The European Union's own claims that it does not provide financial support directly to the Sudanese government are contradicted by evidence, including a 2018 factsheet stating "The EU does not provide any financial support to the Government of Sudan..." However, an investigation by Deutsche Welle revealed that EU funding was being diverted for repressive aims.
EU arms exports have also contributed to the conflict. French-made systems and British military equipment found in RSF convoys suggest that European-made weapons are fueling the violence. The use of 81mm mortar shells found in Sudanese battlefields, which were manufactured by a Bulgarian firm exported to the UAE, highlights a pattern of diversion.
European suppliers share responsibility for ensuring compliance with export regulations. However, governments continue to issue new export licences to potential violators, including the UAE. The UK approved over $227 million in military exports to the UAE between April and June this year, despite being informed that Emirati-supplied equipment had reached the RSF.
The lack of control over arms shipments is not unique to Europe; South Africa has faced similar criticism for its failure to ensure compliance with end-user agreements. Evidence suggests that South African weapons may have been diverted to Sudan as well.
To reclaim credibility, democratic governments must implement enforceable end-use monitoring. Export control authorities and the EU must publish transparent audits of past licences, investigate credible diversion cases, and suspend new approvals where risk remains unmitigated. Without these measures, Europe's migration policy and South Africa's defence trade risk complicity in a grim paradox: initiatives justified in the name of security that foster insecurity.
The EU's strategy of "externalising" migration control, providing aid, training, and equipment to African states to reduce irregular migration towards Europe, has had unintended consequences. In Sudan, this approach merged with opaque arms flows, Gulf intermediaries, and weak oversight, allowing the EU-funded Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to benefit from billions of euros in funding.
The European Union's own claims that it does not provide financial support directly to the Sudanese government are contradicted by evidence, including a 2018 factsheet stating "The EU does not provide any financial support to the Government of Sudan..." However, an investigation by Deutsche Welle revealed that EU funding was being diverted for repressive aims.
EU arms exports have also contributed to the conflict. French-made systems and British military equipment found in RSF convoys suggest that European-made weapons are fueling the violence. The use of 81mm mortar shells found in Sudanese battlefields, which were manufactured by a Bulgarian firm exported to the UAE, highlights a pattern of diversion.
European suppliers share responsibility for ensuring compliance with export regulations. However, governments continue to issue new export licences to potential violators, including the UAE. The UK approved over $227 million in military exports to the UAE between April and June this year, despite being informed that Emirati-supplied equipment had reached the RSF.
The lack of control over arms shipments is not unique to Europe; South Africa has faced similar criticism for its failure to ensure compliance with end-user agreements. Evidence suggests that South African weapons may have been diverted to Sudan as well.
To reclaim credibility, democratic governments must implement enforceable end-use monitoring. Export control authorities and the EU must publish transparent audits of past licences, investigate credible diversion cases, and suspend new approvals where risk remains unmitigated. Without these measures, Europe's migration policy and South Africa's defence trade risk complicity in a grim paradox: initiatives justified in the name of security that foster insecurity.